Political Amnesia

In reply to Laura Tingle's Quarterly Essay, Political Amnesia: How We Forgot How To Govern.

POLITICAL AMNESIA

Correspondence


Graham Evans

Australia faces a set of very difficult challenges, and it has less control over the effectiveness of its responses than has historically been the case. Laura Tingle is right to point out that the explanations frequently given for the decline in policy-making in Australia – the 24-hour news cycle, poll-driven policy options, the rise of the political professional, and the decline of “real life” experience among politicians – are not by themselves sufficient. Her essay also focuses on loss of memory in politics and policy-making, and the collapse of institutions that should be responsible for these, including a risk-averse public service. These are, for her, key factors in explaining the widespread view of those interested in politics and policy that Australia is suffering from “political amnesia,” and has forgotten how to govern.

Bob Hawke’s government is viewed as one of the most talented and effective in recent decades. It had a well-qualified and diverse group of ministers, especially at the outset. It also had a clear view of the structure and processes of government, much of which had been developed by Gareth Evans. I had the opportunity, when co-opted from the public service to be Hawke’s first chief of staff (or principal private secretary), to see this at first-hand. Hawke made it clear from the start that he wanted to govern on the basis of consistent principles:

  • Policy decisions were to be made in an orderly way by cabinet, based on the best available advice and cognisant of the views of interested parties, and subsequently ministers were to be responsible for implementing these decisions.

  • The prime minister’s office was expected to ensure that the policy and political advice to the prime minister was consistent with the government’s objectives and was thorough and timely, but at the end of the day the prime minister was the decision-maker.

  • The prime minister’s office, and indeed the whole of government, needed to work with the public service to make full use of its resources. The public service needed to be involved in developing policy options, not least because it generally had to implement them.

I had the opportunity to speak recently with Hawke. He said, not surprisingly, that none of his views on these elementary but enduring principles had changed, and they remained equally applicable in 2015, despite the many technological and structural changes affecting government that had occurred in subsequent decades.

Tingle raises two matters that are worthy of more detailed comment: the prime minister’s office, and the role of the public service. This is not to claim for either that all worked well in “the good old days.” Demonstrably this was not the case. Nor is it to say these models are readily applicable to a very different world. But there can be important lessons from the past.

Hawke’s four chiefs of staff were all seconded from the public service. But his staff always included senior political advisers who, inter alia, provided views on policy options and certainly had no qualms about putting their views strongly. I was accountable for ensuring this interaction happened. Hawke did not like surprises as a result of inadequate consultation. 

The reconciliation of policy and politics was helped by Hawke being clear on the difference between leading and managing, meaning he was prepared to take on issues that were unpopular. “We are here to make a difference,” he would say. Most of his ministers were the same. One of them stressed to me after he was appointed Minister for Transport and Communications that he wanted the department always to provide first-best policy options, and he would decide on the politics. 

A difficulty I see with the current arrangements for prime ministerial, and indeed ministerial, staff is the larger numbers involved. Hawke’s office was able to function with a third of the staff of recent prime ministers. Too many staff inevitably means competition for access to the prime minister, and there is less incentive to use the public service effectively.

Tingle describes at length the way in which significant parts of the public service have suffered a decline in skills and institutional memory. Many blame the growth in the size and influence of ministerial offices for this decline. This is no doubt a contributing factor because little encouragement is given them to work together effectively. But ultimately this is an issue on which leadership has to come from the top. Unless the prime minister of the day is clear about how he or she expects ministerial offices and the public service to work together, it will not happen.

Hawke made this point by making regular visits to the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, as did other Hawke government ministers. As Hawke’s chief of staff I spoke to Mike Codd and Geoff Yeend as secretaries of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet a couple of times each day.

Institutional memory is an interesting concept. How individuals recall the past influences how they act in the present. Hawke’s belief that the Whitlam government had not used the public service well affected how he saw that relationship. It is also often the case that public servants in the same institutions for lengthy periods are most resistant to policy change. 

Companies often have a different view of institutional memory to the public sector – they don’t want their executives to take institutional memory with them if they leave for a competitor. This is generally reflected in employment contracts, and extended “gardening leave” for departing executives.

The challenge for the public service, as Tingle’s essay highlights, is how best to learn from the past. But there are other fundamental considerations at work. Central to having governments use the public service effectively, and to attracting good people, is to involve public servants from the outset in the development of policy and its implementation. At present public servants are often brought into the process late or not at all, and yet are expected to implement the policy. 

Public servants are also increasingly risk-averse, because they are blamed for mistakes, not always of their own making, that get into the public fora. Of course they should be held accountable for avoidable failures. But if public servants are expected to be more innovative and less risk-averse, there needs to be clarity from the start as to both responsibility and accountability. The shift to greater use of contracts for the public service has only exacerbated the inclination to be risk-averse. A recent Victorian auditor-general’s report into the East-West Link included the following observation: “Some public servants involved in this audit indicated that providing frank and fearless advice when they believe a government does not want to receive it will negatively impact their influence or career opportunities.”

Policy change is always difficult. The losers know who they will be, but the winners are frequently not aware until after the changes have been made. Vested interests, whether corporate or union, are aggressive and sophisticated in protecting their positions. If governments are to achieve significant reform, the community needs to be engaged and informed of the benefits. While ministers need to play the main role, some part of this responsibility will fall to the public servants, and so progress will involve some risk-taking. The public servants involved in the major changes to communication and transport in the late 1980s and early 1990s can vouch for this, but the productivity gains continue to flow to the economy. In my view the capacity to reform transport and communications existed in the public service in the late 1980s. When it was galvanised by a political commitment to microeconomic reform, and the public service was engaged and worked closely with ministers, reform happened.

Political Amnesia should provoke serious consideration of more effective ways of governing modern Australia, and if it does this it will have been an important contribution to tackling the tough challenges we face.

Graham Evans

CONTINUE READING

This is a reply to Laura Tingle’s Quarterly Essay, Political Amnesia: How We Forgot How To Govern. To read the full essay, login, subscribe, or buy the book.

ALSO FROM QUARTERLY ESSAY

Lech Blaine
Peter Dutton's Strongman Politics
Alan Kohler
Australia's Housing Mess and How to Fix It
Micheline Lee
Disability, Humanity and the NDIS
Megan Davis
On Recognition and Renewal
Saul Griffith
Electrification and Community Renewal
Katharine Murphy
Albanese and the New Politics